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Limited studies have examined the effect of feedback sensitivity and intrinsic motivation on 
cognitive performance. The present study serves as a pilot project for a study at the University of 
Tennessee at Chattanooga that examines the modulating role of external, monetary reward 
incentives and cognitive intrinsic motivation on cognitive control. For the present study, the 
relationship among cognitive performance outcomes (reaction time and accuracy) on an adapted 
Stimulus Reward Association Stroop Task will be explored. Two main hypotheses were tested in 
the present study: H1 Reaction time on congruent trials will be significantly faster than reaction 
time on incongruent trials. H2  Accuracy on congruent trials will be significantly greater than 
accuracy on incongruent trials. Implications from the findings of this study will provide a 
foundation for future examinations of the motivational factors and feedback conditions that 
affect cognitive performance.  
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“A Penny for Your Thoughts:” Developing an Adapted Stimulus Reward Association – 
Stroop Task to Assess the Impact of Individual Difference Factors on Cognitive Control  
 
Cognitive control refers to the role of varying dimensions of executive function (EF) in 
regulation of attention, memory, and behavioral outputs oriented towards completion of a task 
(Botvinick & Braver 2015). In a contextualized scenario, a working professional intends to 
complete a written manuscript before the upcoming deadline. At times, this individual is able to 
implement effective strategies for directing their attention towards completion of the manuscript. 
However, they are intermittently distracted by emails, initiating conversations with co-workers, 
and surveying any updates on their Instagram feed. The person diverts their attention to these 
secondary activities, under the reasoning that a break is justified after long hours in the office 
setting. Later, the person re-directs their attention to completion of the manuscript, as the 
deadline is fast-approaching and proficient work could yield long term professional 
advancement. This brief vignette of a working professional demonstrates an application of 
cognitive control, where this individual needed to inhibit routine behavioral responses that 
directly conflicted with their goal-oriented behavior. When those circumstances occurred, there 
was opposition between automatic or impulsive behaviors and those that are goal-oriented. This 
opposition is referred to as cognitive conflict and presents a scenario where cognitive control is 
needed to attenuate task-irrelevant factors in favor of task-relevant ones (Abrahamse et al., 
2013).  
Underlying cognitive control are dual mechanisms of control: proactive control and 
reactive control (Braver & Burgess, 2008). Through goal-activation and maintenance, proactive 
cognitive control selects for task-relevant information prior to initiation of a cognitively-
demanding task. Reactive control differs in that it utilizes conflict detection, response inhibition, 
and resolution after a cognitively-demanding task has occurred (Mäki-Marttunen et al., 2019). 
To demonstrate proactive and reactive control in a scenario, an undergraduate student needs to 
stop for gas on their drive home from campus. This individual establishes exiting the interstate to 
receive gas as prior selection for a goal-oriented behavior, where the execution of this plan is 
guided by proactive control. However, the student often drives to their house from campus 
without making any stops, which creates a conflict between the automatic, routine behavior of 
driving home and the goal-oriented behavior of making an additional stop. Based on this 
scenario, proactive control integrated the task-relevant selection of stopping for gas through 
preparatory attention, while reactive control characterized resolving the cognitive conflict 
between the routine drive and the goal of stopping (Braver & Burgess, 2008).  
Stroop Task 
 Assessment of cognitive proactive and reactive control can be done within the well-
documented conflict paradigm of the Stroop Color and Word Test (Stroop, 1935). Often referred 
to as the Stroop task, this task involves individuals stating the ink color of a presented word. The 
words in the Stroop task are color words, like blue, green, red, and yellow but they are also 
presented in colored text. The words can be presented in a congruent color (“GREEN”) or an 
incongruent color (“GREEN”). For each word, individuals must exert cognitive control and 
disregard the semantic meaning of the written word. Therefore, a correct response to the trial 
(“GREEN”) would be red, as that is the ink color of the word, and not green, the actual word that 
is written. The Stroop task induces a high level of cognitive conflict as it requires inhibition of 
information that is usually needed (the semantic meaning) and instead requires modulating 
attention towards the usually unneeded, but now task-relevant, information of the ink color.  
 Proactive control, in context of the Stroop task, mediates the extent of cognitive conflict 
by applying the rules of the task instructions. In this way proactive control sets the goal-oriented 
behavior and selects, early on, the task-relevant information. Specifically, this means that when 
individuals use proactive control on the Stroop task, they focus their attention on preparing for 
incongruence in ink color and semantic meaning (Abrahamse et al., 2013). In comparison, 
reactive control is unrelated to early selection or preparatory attention for cognitive conflict. This 
mechanism mediates cognitive conflict just after being presented a stimulus (Braver, 2012). 
Therefore, reactive control happens between the presentation of a trial and the individual’s 
response.  
 Previous findings from the Stroop task exhibit relatively consistent results across reaction 
time and accuracy in participant performance, enough to be termed the Stroop effect. A 
replication study of the Stroop Effect in Nepal examined 30 healthy male students for reaction 
time across congruent (“RED”) and incongruent (“RED”) conditions in the classical Stroop 
design (Ghimire et al., 2014). The reaction times for both conditions demonstrated a significant 
increase in reaction time for the incongruent condition, in comparison to the congruent condition. 
Further, accuracy was examined across both congruence conditions in this sample. The results 
exhibited 0 errors in the congruent condition, while 60% of participants made 1 or more errors in 
the incongruent condition. Therefore, the empirical study demonstrated a slower reaction time 
and a decreased accuracy for incongruent trials, in comparison to congruent trials (Ghimire et al., 
2014). These findings are consistent with the overall predicted effect of the Stroop task, as first 
demonstrated by John Ridley Stroop in 1935, where it was noted that participants responded 
slower and less accurately to presentations of incongruence in word color and meaning (Stroop, 
1935).  
Further, the effects of both accuracy and reaction time can be examined by the presence 
of a speed-accuracy tradeoff (Wylie et al., 2009). This strategic method for completing a 
cognitively demanding task is examined through the level of accuracy on the speed of 
completion. For example, a corporate data analyst may favor an increase in precision and 
accuracy when inputting data points, at the expense of fast task completion. Therefore, this 
strategic approach to a task can inversely increase accuracy (fewer errors) at the cost of speed or 
increase speed at the cost of accuracy (greater errors). This speed-accuracy tradeoffs can be 
consciously chosen by the individual, or serve as an underlying mechanism affecting accuracy 
outcomes. In the Stroop effect, increased accuracy demonstrates a tradeoff for slower reaction 
time across both the congruent and incongruent conditions.  
Feedback Sensitivity  
Demanding tasks, like the Stroop task, require substantial and elongated attention 
modulation, working memory (WM), and cognitive control (Kool et al., 2012). This cost for 
initiating and maintaining goal-orientation through both proactive control and reactive control is 
in direct relationship with the associated benefit of the task goal (Westbrook & Braver, 2015). To 
elaborate, the interaction between cost and benefit serves as a cognitive tradeoff between the cost 
of maintaining proactive and reactive control mechanisms in cognitively demanding tasks in 
relation to the level of perceived benefit (Westbrook & Braver, 2015). This cognitive cost, higher 
with increasing levels of cognitive conflict, can be mitigated by the presentation of an extrinsic 
reward, like receiving positive feedback (Scott et al., 2015). Feedback sensitivity can thus be 
examined in relation to cognitive control, but it may not be the only important factor, as 
cognitive intrinsic motivation may also interact with the relationship. However, this relationship 
will not be explored in the analysis of the present study, but the conditions of feedback and no-
feedback are present in the adapted Stroop task used in the experiment. The establishment of 
whether the present task first replicates the expected results of the Stroop task will allow for 
further exploration into this relationship.  
Cognitive Intrinsic Motivation 
The willingness to exude cognitive effort, and the associated personal value associated 
with this effort, is defined as cognitive intrinsic motivation (Inzlicht et al., 2018). Cognitive 
intrinsic motivation can be assessed by the Need for Cognition (NFC) scale, which examines this 
individual trait disposition across an 18-item questionnaire (Cacioppo, Petty, & Kao, 1984). On 
this scale, an individual who scores high is considered to have a significantly greater value 
associated with cognitive effort, in contrast to an individual who scores lower. In the presence of 
an external incentive, individuals who have lower NFC scores increase their cognitive effort 
(Sandra & Otto, 2018). However, the presence of external incentive led to a decrease in cognitive 
effort for individuals with higher NFC scores. These findings suggest that for those with lower 
NFC scores, or a lower amount of value attributed to cognitive effort, poor performance on 
cognitive tasks can be mitigated by the presence of an external incentive. Further, those with 
higher NFC scores are less impacted, if at all, by the presence of external incentive. This may be 
due to their perception of the ratio of task cost to benefit not being significantly altered with an 
additional, external source of motivation. With this finding in mind, it is possible that 
individual’s cognitive intrinsic motivation can further inform the relationship between reactive 
control in cognitive performance on the Stroop task in the presence or absence of feedback. This 
relationship will not be explored in the analysis of the present study, but the findings from this 
research will allow for future analysis into the effect of cognitive intrinsic motivation on Stroop 
task performance.  
Purpose of the Present Study 
The present study serves as a pilot project for a study at the University of Tennessee at 
Chattanooga that examines the modulating roles of external, monetary reward incentives and 
cognitive intrinsic motivation on cognitive control in a conflict paradigm, an adapted Stimulus-
Reward Association (SRA) Stroop Task. For the present study, an adapted Stroop task was 
designed to integrate feedback, and eventually reward conditions, into the classic design of 
Stroop Color and Word Test (Krebs, Boehler, & Woldorff, 2010). This Stimulus-Reward 
Association (SRA) Stroop task retains all the same characteristics of the classic Stroop design, 
assessing the impact of congruency on cognitive performance across reaction time, accuracy, and 
a speed-accuracy tradeoff. The establishment that the Stroop effect is replicated in the adapted 
Stimulus-Reward Association Stroop task is necessary for later analysis into the effects of 
individual difference factors across feedback sensitivity and cognitive intrinsic motivation.  
For the purpose of the present study, the following questions were explored: 1) What is 
the impact of word/color congruency on reaction time in an adapted SRA Stroop Task? and 2) 
What is the impact of word/color congruency on accuracy in an adapted SRA Stroop Task? 
Specifically, I hypothesized that the typical Stroop effects, where accuracy is greater and 
reaction time is faster on congruent trials than on incongruent trials, will be replicated with the 
adapted SRA-Stroop Task.  
Method 
Participants 
Student participants (N = 10) were recruited from the University of Tennessee at 
Chattanooga by means of direct recruitment. For this pilot study, only a small sample size was 
assessed to determine whether the development of the adapted SRA-Stroop task replicates the 
typical effect in a classic Stroop task design. Participants were excluded from the study if they 
indicated any history of color deficiency or other condition(s) that would affect visual ability. 
Participants were also excluded if they had sustained a concussion within the last 90 days. No 
incentives were given for participation in this study.  
Measures 
Need for Cognition Scale 
The Need for Cognition scale is an 18-item questionnaire that was used in this study as a 
measure of cognitive intrinsic motivation. The NFC scale measures a participants self-reported 
enjoyment of engaging with cognitively demanding activities (Caccioppo & Petty, 1982). For 
this questionnaire, the participant responds to statements like, “I prefer complex to simple 
problems” and “I prefer my life to be filled with puzzles I must solve” on a 7-point Likert scale. 
The Need for Cognition scale is integrated procedurally for the purpose of future study, but will 
not be examined in the statistical analyses for the present study. 
Stroop Color and Word Test (SCWT) 
The Stroop Color and Word Test (SCWT) is a neuropsychological experiment that 
measures the role of cognitive control in conflict situations (Krebs, Boehler, & Woldorff, 2010). 
The Stroop task requires naming the presented color of a word. On this task the presented color 
can be congruent with its semantic meaning (“BLUE”) or incongruent with its semantic meaning 
(“BLUE”). For the present study, an adapted Stroop task was presented using SuperLab 5 on an 
iMac desktop computer in UTC’s Assessing Cognition Lab. The adapted Stroop task was 
modeled after Krebs, Boehler, and Woldorff’s (2010) Stimulus-Reward Association Stroop Task. 
In the adapted Stroop task used in this study, participants identified the task-relevant 
dimension of naming the presented color of a word in each trial, while ignoring the task-
irrelevant information of the word’s semantic meaning. The words used in this task were: 
“RED”, “YELLOW”, “BLUE”, “GREEN”, or “BROWN.”  The word “BROWN” served as the 
neutral condition. Each color word was presented in one of four colors (“RED”, “YELLOW”, 
“BLUE”, or “GREEN”) and each of those colors was assigned a key on the keyboard. 
Participants were instructed at the start of the task to respond as accurately and quickly as 
possible by pressing the key associated with the presented color of each word within the allotted 
time frame. Participant reaction times were recorded for each trial and accuracy was also 
calculated. 
Each trial within this paradigm began with a fixation square in the center of a black 
screen. After a variable time of 500 to 1500 ms, the fixation square was replaced by a color 
word. Each word appeared on the screen for 300 ms and participants had up to 1800 - 2200 ms to 
respond (Krebs, Boehler, & Woldorff, 2010). Any response outside that window was not 
recorded. Two of the four presented colors (BLUE and GREEN) were associated with the 
potential for symbolic feedback in the form of a check mark symbol for correct responses or a 
hashtag symbol (#) for incorrect responses. The other two presented colors (RED and YELLOW) 
were not associated with any feedback. The feedback symbol appeared on the screen for 100ms. 
After the 100 ms, the next trial began. 
The word “BROWN” served as a neutral stimulus. This word was presented in each of 
the colors but was not associated with feedback. The presentation of the neutral stimulus 
(“BROWN”) was dispersed evenly throughout all trials in the task and served as a baseline for 
performance. In total, participants completed four experimental blocks, each consisting of 160 
trials. Between each block, participants received four, 20 second, breaks. Over all four blocks, 
there were an evenly distributed 320 potential-feedback trials (BLUE and GREEN) and 320 no-
feedback trials (RED and YELLOW). Further breakdown of the distribution of trials is as 
follows in Table 1:  
 
Table 1: Proportion of Trials by Congruency and Feedback 
 
FEEDBACK: Total = 320 trials  
Congruent, Feedback-related (BLUE or GREEN):     25% of trials 
Incongruent, Feedback-related (BLUE or GREEN):    25% of trials 
Incongruent, Feedback-unrelated (RED YELLOW RED YELLOW): 25% of trials 
 Neutral (BROWN or BROWN):       25% of trials 
NO FEEDBACK: Total = 320 trials 
 Congruent (RED or YELLOW):      25% of trials 
 Incongruent, Feedback-related (GREEN BLUE GREEN BLUE):  25% of trials 
 Incongruent, Feedback-unrelated (YELLOW or RED):   25% of trials 
 Neutral (BROWN or BROWN)      25% of trials 
 
Intrinsic Motivation Inventory 
The Intrinsic Motivation Inventory is a self-reported questionnaire that evaluates 
participants’ subjective experience of an experimental task after it has been completed (Ryan, 
1984). The participants in this study completed four subscales of the Intrinsic Motivation 
Inventory: Interest/Enjoyment, Effort/Importance, Competence, and Pressure/Tension. 
Participants respond on a 7-point Likert scale in terms of their level of agreement to statements 
such as, “While I was working on the task I was thinking about how much I enjoyed it” and “I 
would describe the task as very enjoyable.” The Intrinsic Motivation Inventory is integrated 
procedurally for the purpose of future study, but will not be examined in the statistical analyses 
for the present study. 
Procedure 
Participants met in-person at the UTC Assessing Cognition Lab to complete this study. 
They first read and completed the IRB-approved informed consent. Demographic questions and 
the Need For Cognition scale were then completed via a QuestionPro administered survey on an 
iMac desktop computer within the lab. Upon completion of the Need For Cognition scale, the 
adapted SRA-Stroop Task was presented using SuperLab 5. Following that experimental section, 
the Intrinsic Motivation Inventory was administered to assess subjective experience. A debrief 
on the nature of the experiment was provided to all participants at the conclusion of the study. 
 
Results 
To test my hypothesis that accuracy would be greater and reaction time would be faster 
on congruent trials than on incongruent trials, I first calculated reaction time and accuracy for 
neutral, congruent, and incongruent trials on the adapted SRA Stroop task. Performance on each 
trial was categorized as either a hit, miss, or omission. Responses were considered a “hit” when 
the participant response was correct and recorded within the allotted time frame. A “miss” was 
categorized as a participant incorrectly responding to the presented color of a trial. An 
“omission” was categorized when no response was recorded within the allotted time frame.   
The reaction time data was examined in terms of color/word congruence (congruent, 
incongruent, neutral) and averaged across all ten participants. Means and standard errors for 
reaction time on congruent, incongruent, and neutral trials are presented, and the analysis for 
average correct RT and average incorrect RT, are included in Table 2.  
Table 2: Mean Reaction Time by Trial Congruence 
 Mean (Standard Error) 
 RT Overall Correct RT Incorrect RT 
Congruent 469.9 (14.2) 482.0 (13.7) 439.1 (16.1) 
Incongruent 505.2 (15.5) 518.9 (14.0) 479.9 (20.5) 
Neutral 489.1 (20.5) 496.7 (14.8) 469.0 (20.8) 
 
As presented above in Table 2 and below in Figure 1, average RTs overall were 
significantly faster for congruent trials (“BLUE”) than incongruent trials (“GREEN”), t(9) = -
3.81, p = .004. This pattern of results replicates the typical Stroop effect.  
 
Figure 1: Mean reaction time (ms) and standard error for congruent, incongruent, and 
neutral conditions in the adapted SRA-Stroop task. 
 
Moreover, a repeated measures analysis of variance (ANOVA) demonstrates a main 
effect of accuracy such that when participants responded correctly, reaction times were 
consistently slower than when participants responded incorrectly, F(1,9) = 21.83, p = .001. 











Average Response Times by Congruency
found between accuracy and congruency, F(1,9) = 15.84, p = .003. This pattern of results 
replicates a typical speed-accuracy trade-off. Of note is that the difference between correct and 
incorrect reactions times is slightly less for neutral trials than for congruent or incongruent trials 
but neutral trial RTs were not examined statistically. These differences can be seen below in 
Figure 2. Therefore, the presented data analysis of RT in the 10 participants from this pilot 
project suggest support for my hypothesis: reaction time (RT) on congruent trials will be faster 
than reaction time (RT) on incongruent trials.  
  
Figure 2: Mean correct and incorrect reaction times (ms) and standard error for congruent, 
incongruent, and neutral conditions in the adapted SRA-Stroop task. 
 
In addition to examining reaction times, I also explored how accuracy (hit, miss, or 
omission) differed across congruent, incongruent, and neutral conditions. That data is included 











Response Times by Accuracy
Average Correct RT Average Incorrect RT
Table 3: Mean Accuracy by Trial Congruence 
 Mean Accuracy (Standard Error) 
 Hit Miss Omission 
Congruent 55% (3%) 18% (3%) 26% (2%) 
Incongruent 45% (1%) 20% (2%) 35% (3%) 
Neutral 52% (2%) 18% (3%) 30% (3%) 
 
As presented above in Table 3 and below in Figure 3, participants responded correctly on 
congruent trials (“BLUE”) significantly more often than on incongruent trials. (“GREEN”), t(9) 
= 3.89, p = .004. Participants also responded correctly on neutral trials more often than on 
incongruent trials, but that difference was not examined statistically. Misses were equally as 
likely between congruency types. Omissions, trials where a response was not recorded in the 
allotted time, were more common for incongruent trials, and least common for congruent trials. 
This pattern of results replicates the typical Stroop effect and suggests support for my 
hypothesis: accuracy on congruent trials will be significantly greater than accuracy on 
incongruent trials.   



















Figure 3: Accuracy by percentage of hits, misses, or omissions on the congruent, 
incongruent, and neutral conditions in the adapted SRA-Stroop task. 
Discussion 
 The results of the present study using an adapted SRA-Stroop task indicate support for 
the expected results of a typical Stroop task. The findings supported the two hypotheses of this 
study by demonstrating a decrease in reaction time and accuracy for the incongruent condition, 
in comparison to the neutral and congruent conditions. Further, a speed-accuracy tradeoff was 
exhibited by the slower reaction time for correct responses across all conditions. Therefore, the 
expected Stroop effect was replicated in the data analysis of this phase of the study. These 
findings suggest that the adapted SRA-Stroop task can be used in future studies to examine the 
impacts of feedback sensitivity, extrinsic reward, and cognitive intrinsic motivation on cognitive 
control.  
Limitations 
 The primary limitation of the present study is the relatively small sample (n=10) 
completing the experiment, which exhibits an inability to sufficiently assess for applicable 
statistical significance in data analysis. For the 10 participants in this pilot project, the 
demographic questions were not recorded, which serves as a limitation for analyzing the data in 
terms of demographics. Further, this phase of the study is limited by the non-representative 
sampling method for obtaining participants, through the direct means of recruitment. Moreover, 
the sample population of undergraduate students serves as a limitation, where an academic 
setting may not demonstrate a representative distribution of cognitive intrinsic motivation or 
cognitive performance. Alongside this, undergraduate students fall primarily in the range of 18 to 
22 years old, which exhibits a lack of generalizability for the present findings.  
 In terms of the Stroop Task, extraneous and uncontrolled factors could potentially 
influence cognitive control, such as loud noise obstructions from construction outside the 
laboratory impeding on the ability to implement effective modulation of attention. Additionally, 
the presence of the experimenter in the lab setting could have integrated an additional social-
perceived pressure while completing the study. This component has been altered in the protocol 
for experiments following this preliminary phase of testing to remove the possibility of socially 
induced effects on task performance. Also, the experimental design of the adapted Stroop task on 
Superlab 5 was constructed with key-color associations on the right side of the keyboard, which 
provides a right-hand dominant advantage for participants. In the following experiments, 
participants with left-hand dominance are not included in the study, as there is a preferential 
design within the present study for right hand participants. Lastly, comments from participants 
following completion of the study suggest a limitation in the Stroop design itself, as a small 
number of participants suggested that the primarily effective method for completion of the task 
was unfocusing their attention to the word by directing attention elsewhere on the screen and 
observing only the color. This strategic response method of not reading the semantic meaning of 
the presented word serves as a reduction in cognitive conflict, which alters the interaction of 
proactive and reactive control in response time and accuracy, and consequently, skews the data 
of participants who implement this method for response.  
Implications and Future Directions 
 The present study suggests support for the development of this adapted SRA-Stroop task 
as an assessment of cognitive control, as participant performance outcomes were consistent with 
the expected results of the Stroop task. The findings of the present study suggest that the adapted 
SRA-Stroop task can be used to assess cognitive control in relation to extrinsic incentives, such 
as feedback, and cognitive intrinsic motivation. In future directions, the study needs to include a 
larger sample size, including participants from a more comprehensive background. An increase 
in demographic diversity of participants is needed for an increased level of ecological validity in 
assessing the relationships of feedback sensitivity, cognitive intrinsic motivation, and cognitive 
control performance.  
To further contextualize these results for clinical use, sample populations of individuals 
with diagnosed schizophrenia, and other mental health conditions relating to cognitive control, 
should be assessed. As a paradigm concerning the assessment of selective attention, the Stroop 
task has often been employed to investigate attention deficits in clinical populations, such as 
individuals with the diagnosis of schizophrenia (Perlstein et al., 1998, Fervaha et al., 2014). In 
empirical assessments of cognitive control, decreased proactive control and increased reactive 
control has been associated with individuals with schizophrenia (Barch & Ceaser, 2012; 
Edwards, Barch, & Braver, 2010). Pragmatically, results from SCWT assessments of proactive 
and reactive control in this clinical population advance our current understanding of the 
cognitive behavioral mechanisms underlying schizophrenia. Further, these findings are 
applicable for the exploration of potential assessments, interventions, and treatment strategies 
related to preparatory attention and inference, conflict resolution.  
Further, the findings exhibit the importance of additional study in assessing cognitive 
control, as there is a significant amount of remaining unknowns related to the factors influencing 
cognitive performance. Future studies could explore other motivation factors, such as the impact 
from baseline measurements of other intrinsic motivation dimensions like creative or 
physiological motivation. Further, assessment of additional extrinsic motivational factors, such 
as the role of fear, power, or affiliation-related motivations, could yield greater insight into the 
relationship of motivation and cognitive control. The examination of cognitive control, measured 
by an experimental condition other than the presently adapted Stroop task, can also provide an 
examination of this relationship by comparing results across a differing conflict paradigm. For 
example, the implementation of an A-X continuous performance task would provide further 
findings that elaborate on the focus on this study.  
The present study serves as a pilot project for a study examining external, monetary 
reward incentives and cognitive intrinsic motivation on performance in an adapted Stimulus-
Reward Association Stroop Task. With the establishment that this adapted Stroop task replicates 
the expected Stroop Effect, further study on individual differences on cognitive performance can 
be examined. The implications of these findings, with the future studies conducted with this 
adapted SRA-Stroop task, are applicable to expanding our current framework of cognitive 
outcomes. Assessments of cognitive control, both within and outside the clinical setting, could 
approach effective intervention and compensatory strategies for individuals with deficits in 
attention modulation. Further, findings that examine the addition of external motivation could be 
applied within these interventions, as individuals with decreased cognitive intrinsic motivation 
for goal completion could experience substantial increases with the introduction of extrinsic 
factors to compensate for low motivation. These findings illuminate an understudied dynamic in 
our current model and approach to cognition, alongside establishing the potential for remediation 
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